The Turkish-Israeli Cold War
土耳其-以色列之冷战风云
Henri J. Barkey | September 7, 2011
2011年9月7日 ｜ 亨利 J.Barkey
On Friday, the Turkish government declared a Cold War on Israel. It kicked out Israel’s ambassador, downgraded diplomatic relations with Israel to the second-secretary level and canceled the military relationship. The consequences of this crisis for the stability of the eastern Mediterranean and for the Obama administration are quite severe. The Erdogan government is now saying explicitly something it had implied for the last two years—that Washington has to choose between two allies, Ankara and Jerusalem. The Arab Spring, especially events in Syria, and the planned U.S. withdrawal from Iraq have catapulted Turkey to an unprecedented level of importance. In fact, it was not a coincidence that the day they announced their Israel policy, the Turks also gave the go ahead to the installation of radars for the missile defense system Washington has been clamoring for so long.
土耳其政府在星期五宣布对以色列实施冷战。他们驱逐以色列大使，下调与以色列的外交关系至二等秘书级别并取消两国间的军事联系。这次危机对东地中海的地区稳定和奥巴马政府产生了严重影响。现在埃尔多安政府明确提出，也就近两年所做的暗示--华盛顿必须在两个同盟国中作出选择，安卡拉还是耶路撒冷。阿拉伯之春，叙利亚发生的特殊事件，以及美国从伊拉克有计划的撤军，土耳其的重要性一下子被提升到前所未有的高度。实际上，那天宣布对以政策并非巧合，土耳其另外还同意安装美国长期以来梦寐以求的导弹防御系统雷达。
This diplomatic crisis between Israel and Turkey had been simmering for more than a year. Ever since Israeli forces attempting to prevent a Turkish-led flotilla from breaking through the Israeli blockade of Gaza killed nine Turkish participants, the two countries have been exchanging accusations. The current impasse, however, is the culmination of a long process of deterioration and makes foes of two countries whose relationship was once heralded as groundbreaking and strategic.
以色列和土耳其的这场外交风波暗中已经持续了一年多。自从以色列军队企图阻止一支由土耳其人引导的小型船队突破加沙封锁，杀死九名土耳其人，两国便开始相互指责。然而，当前的僵局是双方关系长期恶化的集中爆发，这两个曾经宣称彼此在外交关系和战略合作方面取得突破性进展的国家，现在却反目成仇。
The Justice and Development Party government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had begun to sour on Israel following Israel’s incursion into Gaza in late 2008. Erdogan was miffed that the then Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert, who had visited him in Ankara only four days before the impending hostilities in Gaza, kept him in dark. As a consequence of the incursion, Israeli-Syrian negotiations that had made considerable progress under Turkish auspices fell apart, depriving Erdogan of what he thought was an important breakthrough.
2008年末以色列入侵加沙后，正义发展党政府总理埃尔多安就开始对以色列感到失望。对加沙发动战争四天前，时任以色列总理埃胡德·奥尔默特访了埃尔多安却把他蒙在了鼓里，这令他非常恼火。那次入侵的后果就是由土耳其主持的叙以和谈，在取得很大进展的情况谈判破裂，这让埃尔多安未能取得他所认为的重要突破。
After the Gaza incident at the yearly Davos meetings in Switzerland, Erdogan publicly berated Israeli president Shimon Peres, paradoxically one of Turkey’s greatest supporters. Received as a hero after Davos in Turkey, Erdogan dramatically increased the stridency of his rhetoric against Israel. The Turkish prime minister became the most popular leader in the proverbial Arab street.
加沙事件发生后，每年一次的达沃斯论坛在瑞士召开，埃尔多安在会上公开批评以色列总统佩雷斯，而矛盾的是，佩雷斯是土耳其最强大的支持者。达沃斯论坛结束后，在土耳其人们像迎接英雄一样欢迎埃尔多安回国，他大大提高了对以色列批评的调门。土耳其总理成了阿拉伯街头众所周知最受欢迎的领导人。
Then came the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident: Israelis completely bungled the operation. They disregarded the publicly available information on the Turkish group organizing the flotilla and, more importantly, sent forces to intercede without any serious training or accurate intelligence. As a result, the Israelis landing on the ship encountered resistance and fired their weapons in panic. Cue the second terrible error in judgment: Instead of facing up to the fact that it had erred in sending unprepared soldiers into what amounted to be a trap, the Israeli government circled the wagons. Given the magnitude of the fiasco and its possible ramifications, those who were responsible should have been punished. None of that happened, of course, and no one lost his or her job as a result.
然后发生了“蓝色马尔马拉号”事件：以色列彻底搞砸了这次行动。他们忽视了那些可用的公开信息--船队是由土耳其人组织的，更重要的是，在没有认真训练，没有获得准确情报的情况下就出兵干预。结果，以色列人登上轮船时遇到了抵抗，他们惊慌失措并开枪还击。请注意第二项可怕的误判：以色列政府派遣毫无准备的士兵上船，就好比给他们设了个圈套，政府不是勇敢地面对自己犯下的错误，反而坚称这是在捍卫自己的利益。鉴于这次失败的严重程度和可能产生的后果，必须对该事件相关负责人进行惩罚。这事当然并没有发生，结果就是没人因为这事丢掉自己的饭碗。
As Turkey insisted on an apology and compensation, it became clear that Israel had lost the public-opinion contest and may even be forced to relax the embargo on Gaza. Having found that it had done nothing wrong, the Netanyahu government refused. If domestic politics in both countries appeared to prevent a compromise from emerging, the fact is that there were many behind the scenes diplomatic efforts, including face-to-face discussions, to resolve the problem. The United Nations formed the Palmer Commission to come up with a face-saving way for the two countries to patch their differences. The commission’s report, leaked to the New York Times, found that the Israelis had indeed used excessive force but that the Gaza embargo was legal.
因为土耳其坚持要求以色列向其正式道歉并支付赔偿，在这场民意测验比赛中以色列明显已经输了，甚至还可能被迫放松对加沙的封锁。内塔尼亚胡政府认为他们没有做错，拒绝了土耳其的要求。看上去两国的国内政治是要阻止妥协方案的出台，而事实上双方在幕后已做了多次外交努力，包括面对面讨论解决这个问题。联合国成立以帕尔默为首的调查小组为两国弥和分歧找出体面方法。据透露给《纽约时报》的消息，调查小组的报告认为以色列过分使用武力，而对加沙的封锁是符合国际法的。
On the Israeli side, hard-line foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman at every turn tried to prevent a negotiated outcome from being finalized. Turks did not make it easier either by taking inflexible positions that made it hard for the Israelis to apologize. As I understand it, in December 2010, the two sides had come close to an agreement: Israel would apologize and provide compensation. However, Jerusalem wanted the agreement to also state that it had acted in self-defense. Turks would not agree to the latter condition, and the deal collapsed. There are many on both sides of this divide who worked desperately to prevent this turn of events, and they must feel terribly unhappy and bruised.
在以色列这边，主张强硬路线的外交部长利伯曼每次到谈判关键时刻就设法阻止产生最终的谈判结果。和谈另一方的所做所为也没能使谈判变得更加容易，土耳其采取强硬立场使得以色列的道歉变得更加困难。据我了解，在2010年12月，双方即将达成共识：以色列将向土耳其道歉并支付赔偿。但是，耶路撒冷想在协议中另外表明那是一种自卫行为。土耳其不同意，随后谈判破裂。 为了弥和分歧，两边有很多人竭尽全力想阻止事态发生变，谈判破裂他们肯定闷闷不乐，非常受伤。
Significantly, it appears that Turkey’s tactics shifted considerably in the intervening year since the original crisis. Ankara thinks that it is in the driver’s seat not just with respect to Israel, but also the rest of the Middle East. This is a gambit for leadership in the region. The Turks have gone beyond the demand for an apology by conditioning a return to the status quo ante on the lifting of the Gaza embargo, something to which they know Israel cannot and will not acquiesce. That conditionality is something that no other regional government has ever contemplated, much less articulated. By doing so Erdogan has once again captured the imagination of the region.
值得注意的是，自从最初的危机出现后，随后的年份里土耳其快速调整了自己的策略。安卡拉认为自己居于主导位置，不仅是对以色列，对其他中东国家也一样。这就是地区领导者的开场白。土耳其需要的不再仅仅是道歉，他开出了取消加沙封锁和恢复战前状态的条件，他们知道这个条件以色列不可能也不会答应。这种条件是那些地方政府从没奢望过的，更不用说明明白白地表述出来。埃尔多安的这次行为再次激发了人们对这个地区的想象力。
This is a win-win for him not just abroad but also at home. The crisis with Israel will help him change the narrative as he begins to push for a much-needed and major overhaul of the Turkish constitutional system—it must be updated to start accommodating Kurdish demands, something that will be terribly difficult as the reforms go against almost ninety years of republican history. The Israel crisis, as evidenced by the heated rhetoric, is a perfect foil that can be easily activated at a moment’s notice.
这一行动为埃尔多安在国内外赢得了大量的支持。正当埃尔多安开始努力争取对土耳其宪法制度进行迫切全面的重大修改--必须革新来满足库尔德人的要求，而要改革近90年的共和国历史困难丛丛，与以色列的危机帮他改变这个故事。以色列危机就是激烈争辩的证据，也是一种完美的陪衬，无疑能够引起人们一时的关注。
Israel, for historical, emotional and realpolitik considerations, has been one of Washington’s closest allies with great support of both aisles of the political divide. A deepening crisis could even pit the administration against Congress. This may be one of the outcomes the Turks are banking on. The Netanyahu government has much to answer for in its lack of leadership and navel gazing. But Washington did not read Turkish intentions and goals accurately and therefore could not prevent this turn of events. Whichever way one looks at it, it is a failure of U.S. diplomacy that it will now have to constantly have to act as a buffer between two of its close allies.
从历史，情感和政治方面来说，以色列一直都是华盛顿在政治分歧两方中全力支持且关系最密切的盟友之一。一个更深层次的危机甚至会引发政府机构和国会的竞争。这种也许就是土耳其指望的结果。内塔尼亚胡政府要为缺乏领导能力和自我审视而承担更多的责任。但是华盛顿并没有领会土尔其的意图和准确目标，所以这件事情的发生不可避免。不管怎么看，这都是美国外交上的败笔，现在美国不得不经常地担当这两个亲密盟友间必须的缓冲区。
Image by Boaworm
(图片：Boaworm提供)
